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Run: 29807147048 Workflow: daily-vulnhunter-scan.lock.yml (claude-opus-4.6) Step failed: Execute Claude Code CLI — ran for 609 seconds before failure DIFC posture: Uses github-mcp-server:v1.6.0 with allow-only guard policy (min-integrity: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_MIN_INTEGRITY, repos: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_REPOS). Read-only (GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1). Toolsets: context,repos,issues,pull_requests.
The agent infrastructure (MCP Gateway, firewall, detection) completed successfully. The failure is in the Claude Code CLI execution itself after ~10 minutes. This is likely a task timeout or a logic error in the vulnerability scanning workflow, not a DIFC misconfiguration.
Note: Since artifact downloads are blocked by the secrecy policy, the rpc-messages.jsonl and mcp-gateway.log files cannot be directly inspected. However, the job steps Stop MCP Gateway, Redact secrets in logs, Parse MCP Gateway logs for step summary, and Print firewall logs all succeeded post-failure, indicating the gateway shut down cleanly.
W-2: Daily Sub-Agent Model Resolution Audit — Agent Failure
Run: 29806493363 Workflow: daily-model-resolution.lock.yml (gpt-5.4-mini) Step failed: Execute GitHub Copilot CLI DIFC posture: Uses a locally-built agenticworkflows container (no external GitHub MCP server). The workflow builds the gh-aw CLI from source (Docker image localhost/gh-aw:dev) and uses write-sink guard policies. Does not use tools.github / github-mcp-server.
The activation, MCP Gateway startup, and post-processing steps all succeeded. This appears to be an agent logic or configuration failure (sub-agent model resolution test), not a DIFC issue.
Informational
I-1: DIFC Secrecy Filtering Confirmed Operational
During this audit, the DIFC secrecy policy correctly blocked two categories of privileged access:
Artifact downloads (download_workflow_run_artifact): [Filtered] resource:actions_get exists but is not accessible — filtered by secrecy policy
Job log access (get_job_logs): [Filtered] resource:get_job_logs exists but is not accessible — filtered by secrecy policy
This confirms that the MCP Gateway secrecy-label enforcement is functioning correctly for this audit integration. The audit agent was correctly denied access to private-scoped workflow artifacts and logs.
I-2: Guard Policies Properly Configured
Inspected workflow configurations for runs with GitHub MCP server access:
Workflow
MCP Server
Guard Policy
Read-Only
Toolsets
Daily VulnHunter Scan
github-mcp-server:v1.6.0
allow-only (repos + min-integrity)
Yes
context, repos, issues, pull_requests
Sighthound Security Scan
github-mcp-server:v1.6.0
allow-only (repos + min-integrity)
Yes
context, repos, issues, pull_requests
Daily Safe Outputs Conformance
None (safeoutputs only)
write-sink
N/A
N/A
Daily Sub-Agent Model Resolution
Local agenticworkflows
write-sink
N/A
N/A
PR Sous Chef, Schema Checker, etc.
Varies
write-sink
N/A
N/A
Firewall container gh-aw-firewall v0.27.37 is consistently used across all agentic runs, with a properly scoped allowDomains list that includes api.github.com, github.com, and Copilot API endpoints. Network isolation is enabled ("isolation":true).
I-3: No External API Bypass Attempts Detected
No evidence of agents attempting to contact api.github.com, chatgpt.com, api.openai.com, or other external services directly. All workflows route through the MCP Gateway (awmg-mcpg:8080) as expected. Network topology attachment (topologyAttach: ["awmg-mcpg", "awmg-cli-proxy"]) is correctly configured.
I-4: Action-Required Early-Exits (Expected)
Multiple PR-triggered workflows ended with action_required (pre-activation guardrail):
These are expected: the agent was never invoked, so no MCP traffic or DIFC filtering occurred.
I-5: MCP Artifact Deep Inspection Unavailable
As noted in previous audits, artifact downloads are blocked by the DIFC secrecy policy. Cannot directly verify:
DIFC event counts from rpc-messages.jsonl
Guard error counts from mcp-gateway.log
Filtering ratios or integrity tag scoping
The rpc-messages.jsonl and mcp-gateway.log deep-audit requires either: (a) elevated secrecy permissions for the audit agent, or (b) a summary step that writes aggregate DIFC stats to the GitHub Step Summary (publicly readable).
Investigate VulnHunter timeout: The Execute Claude Code CLI step consistently fails around the 10-minute mark. Review the claude-opus-4.6 agent prompt and task scope in daily-vulnhunter-scan.md — the scanning task may be too broad for a single session, or the Claude Code CLI is hitting a rate limit or context window limit.
Investigate Sub-Agent Model Resolution Audit failure: The Execute GitHub Copilot CLI step fails. Review daily-model-resolution.md and the gpt-5.4-mini model behavior. Since this workflow builds the gh-aw CLI from source, check whether the build artifacts are compatible with the CLI proxy.
Enable DIFC audit telemetry: As noted in prior audits, the audit cannot verify DIFC event counts (labelled/filtered) without artifact access. Consider having the MCP Gateway parse step summary output aggregate DIFC stats to the GitHub Step Summary. This would allow the audit workflow to read aggregate DIFC event counts without needing direct artifact access.
Confirm allow-only scope includes current repository: The VulnHunter and Sighthound workflows use repos: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_REPOS — verify this resolves to a scoped value (e.g., github/gh-aw) and is not left empty or set to public unexpectedly.
Warning
Firewall blocked 1 domain
The following domain was blocked by the firewall during workflow execution:
awmgmcpg
To allow these domains, add them to the network.allowed list in your workflow frontmatter:
Integrity Filtering Audit — github/gh-aw
Audit period: Last 24 hours (2026-07-20T06:45Z – 2026-07-21T06:45Z)
Audit run: 29807798967
Runs analyzed: 60 completed runs in
github/gh-awRuns with agent artifacts: 10 (artifact download blocked by secrecy policy)
Findings Summary
Critical Findings
None identified.
Warnings
W-1: Daily VulnHunter Scan — Agent Failure (Timeout)
Run: 29807147048
Workflow:
daily-vulnhunter-scan.lock.yml(claude-opus-4.6)Step failed:
Execute Claude Code CLI— ran for 609 seconds before failureDIFC posture: Uses
github-mcp-server:v1.6.0withallow-onlyguard policy (min-integrity: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_MIN_INTEGRITY,repos: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_REPOS). Read-only (GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1). Toolsets:context,repos,issues,pull_requests.The agent infrastructure (MCP Gateway, firewall, detection) completed successfully. The failure is in the Claude Code CLI execution itself after ~10 minutes. This is likely a task timeout or a logic error in the vulnerability scanning workflow, not a DIFC misconfiguration.
Note: Since artifact downloads are blocked by the secrecy policy, the
rpc-messages.jsonlandmcp-gateway.logfiles cannot be directly inspected. However, the job stepsStop MCP Gateway,Redact secrets in logs,Parse MCP Gateway logs for step summary, andPrint firewall logsall succeeded post-failure, indicating the gateway shut down cleanly.W-2: Daily Sub-Agent Model Resolution Audit — Agent Failure
Run: 29806493363
Workflow:
daily-model-resolution.lock.yml(gpt-5.4-mini)Step failed:
Execute GitHub Copilot CLIDIFC posture: Uses a locally-built
agenticworkflowscontainer (no external GitHub MCP server). The workflow builds thegh-awCLI from source (Docker imagelocalhost/gh-aw:dev) and useswrite-sinkguard policies. Does not usetools.github/github-mcp-server.The activation, MCP Gateway startup, and post-processing steps all succeeded. This appears to be an agent logic or configuration failure (sub-agent model resolution test), not a DIFC issue.
Informational
I-1: DIFC Secrecy Filtering Confirmed Operational
During this audit, the DIFC secrecy policy correctly blocked two categories of privileged access:
download_workflow_run_artifact):[Filtered] resource:actions_get exists but is not accessible — filtered by secrecy policyget_job_logs):[Filtered] resource:get_job_logs exists but is not accessible — filtered by secrecy policyThis confirms that the MCP Gateway secrecy-label enforcement is functioning correctly for this audit integration. The audit agent was correctly denied access to private-scoped workflow artifacts and logs.
I-2: Guard Policies Properly Configured
Inspected workflow configurations for runs with GitHub MCP server access:
github-mcp-server:v1.6.0allow-only(repos + min-integrity)github-mcp-server:v1.6.0allow-only(repos + min-integrity)agenticworkflowsFirewall container
gh-aw-firewall v0.27.37is consistently used across all agentic runs, with a properly scopedallowDomainslist that includesapi.github.com,github.com, and Copilot API endpoints. Network isolation is enabled ("isolation":true).I-3: No External API Bypass Attempts Detected
No evidence of agents attempting to contact
api.github.com,chatgpt.com,api.openai.com, or other external services directly. All workflows route through the MCP Gateway (awmg-mcpg:8080) as expected. Network topology attachment (topologyAttach: ["awmg-mcpg", "awmg-cli-proxy"]) is correctly configured.I-4: Action-Required Early-Exits (Expected)
Multiple PR-triggered workflows ended with
action_required(pre-activation guardrail):These are expected: the agent was never invoked, so no MCP traffic or DIFC filtering occurred.
I-5: MCP Artifact Deep Inspection Unavailable
As noted in previous audits, artifact downloads are blocked by the DIFC secrecy policy. Cannot directly verify:
rpc-messages.jsonlmcp-gateway.logThe
rpc-messages.jsonlandmcp-gateway.logdeep-audit requires either: (a) elevated secrecy permissions for the audit agent, or (b) a summary step that writes aggregate DIFC stats to the GitHub Step Summary (publicly readable).Runs Analyzed
Multiple CI/infra runs (CI, CGO, CWI, CJS, Deployment Incident Monitor, Label Closed PRs, etc.) omitted — no agent invocation.
Recommendations
Investigate VulnHunter timeout: The
Execute Claude Code CLIstep consistently fails around the 10-minute mark. Review the claude-opus-4.6 agent prompt and task scope indaily-vulnhunter-scan.md— the scanning task may be too broad for a single session, or the Claude Code CLI is hitting a rate limit or context window limit.Investigate Sub-Agent Model Resolution Audit failure: The
Execute GitHub Copilot CLIstep fails. Reviewdaily-model-resolution.mdand the gpt-5.4-mini model behavior. Since this workflow builds thegh-awCLI from source, check whether the build artifacts are compatible with the CLI proxy.Enable DIFC audit telemetry: As noted in prior audits, the audit cannot verify DIFC event counts (labelled/filtered) without artifact access. Consider having the MCP Gateway parse step summary output aggregate DIFC stats to the GitHub Step Summary. This would allow the audit workflow to read aggregate DIFC event counts without needing direct artifact access.
Confirm allow-only scope includes current repository: The VulnHunter and Sighthound workflows use
repos: $GITHUB_MCP_GUARD_REPOS— verify this resolves to a scoped value (e.g.,github/gh-aw) and is not left empty or set topublicunexpectedly.Warning
Firewall blocked 1 domain
The following domain was blocked by the firewall during workflow execution:
awmgmcpgSee Network Configuration for more information.